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Race-Based Peremptories No Longer Permitted in Civil Trials:
Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point
In Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that an attorney may not exercise a peremptory challenge
to strike a prospective civil juror on the basis of the juror's race.2 This ruling is
likely to change fundamentally the process of jury selection in North Carolina.
This Note traces the development of constitutional restraints on the exercise of
peremptory challenges in federal and state courts on both equal protection and
sixth amendment grounds. The Note concludes that the North Carolina
Supreme Court erred in holding that the state constitution places limits on the
exercise of peremptory challenges. The Note further concludes that the supreme
court could have achieved its goal of preventing racial discrimination in civil
jury selection by extending United States Supreme Court precedent on criminal
jury selection into the civil arena.
On February 19, 1978, Mary Jackson, a black woman, 3 died of carbon
monoxide poisoning in her apartment, which was owned and managed by the
Housing Authority of the City of High Point.4 Jackson's administrator, also a
black woman,5 brought a wrongful death suit against the Authority, alleging
that the carbon monoxide entered Jackson's apartment because debris, including
a bird's nest and a bird's carcass, blocked the chimney pipe of the natural gas
heater.6 The claim was brought under theories of negligence, breaches of im-
plied and express warranties of habitability, strict liability, and gross, willful,
and wanton negligence. 7 At the initial trial, the judge directed a verdict in favor
of defendant on all claims. 8 The court of appeals reversed and granted plaintiff a
new trial.9
1. 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988) [hereinafter Jackson III]. This was the third appellate
court decision in this case. In the first, Jackson v. Housing Auth. of High Point, 73 N.C. App. 363,
326 S.E.2d 295 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson 1], the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's directed verdict for defendant. The supreme court, in Jackson v.
Housing Auth. of High Point, 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson 11], affirmed
and remanded for a new trial. The trial on remand produced a jury verdict for defendant. This Note
focuses on the supreme court's opinion upholding that verdict.
2. Jackson II1, 321 N.C. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
3. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Jackson III (No. 8718SC413).
4. Id. The complex, Clara Cox Apartments, was a low-income housing project. Jackson II,
316 N.C. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at 524. Jackson had been a tenant at Clara Cox since 1973. Jackson I,
73 N.C. App. at 364, 326 S.E.2d at 296.
5. Brief for Appellant at 3.
6. Jackson I1, 316 N.C. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at 524.
7. Brief for Appellant at 3.
8. Jackson I1, 316 N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524.
9. Jackson 1, 73 N.C. App. at 364, 326 S.E.2d at 296. The North Carolina Supreme Court
denied the Housing Authority's request to review the court of appeals' decision. Jackson 11, 316
N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524. The Authority, however, appealed the ruling by the court of appeals
reversing dismissal of plaintiff's claim for punitive damages as a matter of right. Id. at 260, 341
S.E.2d at 523. The Authority claimed that punitive damages may not be recovered from a municipal
corporation in a wrongful death action. Id. at 262, 341 S.E.2d at 525. The supreme court held that
"the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act does contain a statutory provision providing for the recov-
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During the voir dire at the second trial, four blacks were called to the jury
box to be considered for service as petit jurors or alternates.10 Defense counsel
exercised peremptory challenges to excuse all four.' I These were defendant's
only peremptory challenges. 12 The resulting jury consisted of twelve white ju-
rors and two white alternate jurors. 13
After the jury was selected, but before it was empaneled, plaintiff's counsel
moved to discharge the jury alleging that its composition violated both the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions. 14 The trial court denied the
motion.' 5 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Housing
Authority. 1 6 Plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals, alleging reversible error
in the trial court'sorefusal to discharge the jury after defense counsel's allegedly
unconstitutional exercise of peremptory challenges. 17 Before the court could
hear argument, however, the supreme court granted defendant's petition for dis-
cretionary review.' 8
The supreme court decided that the jury selection issue is properly resolved
by the North Carolina Constitution rather than the United States Constitu-
tion. 19 Specifically, its opinion rested on article I, section twenty-six of the state
constitution, which provides: "No person shall be excluded from jury service on
account of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin."'20 The court's holding
was succinct: "The sole issue before us on this appeal is whether article I, sec-
tion 26 of the North Carolina Constitution proscribes peremptory challenges to
jurors in civil cases on the basis of race. We hold that it does." '2 1
The court's reasoning also was brief. First, the court noted that article I,
section twenty-six makes no distinction between civil and criminal trials and,
therefore, applies to both.22 Next, the court stated that "this provision of the
constitution would be eviscerated if the use of peremptory challenges did not
come within its ambit."'23 The court concluded its analysis by recognizing that
although the peremptory challenge has been "long embedded in our common
ery of punitive damages from bodies politic, which includes municipal corporations," and thus af-
firmed. Id. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 526-27.
10. Brief for Appellant at 3-4. Three were called to serve on the jury, and one was called as a
prospective alternate.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 4. Defendant actually was entitled to five additional peremptories, but apparently
chose not to exercise them. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-19 (1986) (providing eight peremptory chal-
lenges to each party in a civil case).
13. Brief for Appellant at 4.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 584, 364 S.E.2d at 416; see N.C. R. App. P. 15(a) (allowing either
party to an appeal docketed in the court of appeals to petition the supreme court to hear the case,
thereby bypassing the court of appeals).
19. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
20. N.C. CONST. art I, § 26.
21. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 584-85, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
22. Id. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
23. Id.
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law," its use "is based upon statutory authority and is not of constitutional di-
mension. Therefore, the statutory authority to exercise peremptory challenges
must yield to the constitutional mandate of section 26."24 Nonetheless, because
plaintiff did not provide a transcript of the voir dire from which the court could
determine whether the prospective black jurors improperly were excluded, the
court upheld the trial jury's verdict.25
The purpose of the peremptory challenge "is not only to eliminate extremes
of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom
they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and
not otherwise."' 26 Although not constitutionally required, 27 the peremptory
challenge has "always been considered one of the most effective means of secur-
ing an impartial jury."'28 The peremptory challenge was an essential component
of the English common law29 and was recognized by each state and the federal
government at independence. 30 Although it originally was aimed primarily at
criminal trials, each state today affords peremptory challenges to both sides in
criminal and civil cases.3 1 In North Carolina, both parties to a civil case are
entitled to eight peremptory challenges;32 both the defendant and the state are
entitled to fourteen peremptory challenges in capital criminal cases 33 and six
peremptory challenges in noncapital criminal cases.34 "The persistence of per-
emptories and their extensive use demonstrate the long and widely held belief
that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."'35
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that peremptory challenges
"'may be made or omitted according to the judgment, will, or caprice of the
party entitled thereto, without assigning any reason therefor,' "36 and that a
party's reason for peremptorily challenging "cannot be called in question."' 37
This contrasts with challenges for cause, which "permit rejection of jurors [only]
on a narrowly specific, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality."'38
24. Id. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
25. Id. at 585-86, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
26. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
27. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
28. Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 341 (1982).
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985).
30. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-16.
31. Id. at 216; see Note, supra note 29, at 1359.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-19 (1986).
33. Id. § 15A-1217(a) (1988).
34. Id. § 15A-1217(b).
35. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; see State v. Bryant, 282 N.C. 92, 95, 191 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973).
36. Freeman v. Ponder, 234 N.C. 294, 302, 67 S.E.2d 292, 298 (1951) (quoting 50 C.J.S. Juries
§ 280 (1947)).
37. Dupree v. Virginia Home Ins. Co., 92 N.C. 417, 424 (1885).
38. Swain, 380 U.S. at 22; see Freeman, 234 N.C. at 302, 67 S.E.2d at 298. In North Carolina,
a challenge for cause properly may be exercised against a juror who: 1) is related by blood or
marriage to a criminal defendant, State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 561, 169 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1969); 2)
has formed an opinion as to the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence, State v. Zigler, 42 N.C.
1264 [Vol. 67
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Peremptory challenges provide a mechanism to "eliminat[e] those prospective
jurors who the lawyer believes, but cannot prove, will be less than impartial,"'39
without expanding the limited time and scope of the voir dire. "The peremptory
challenge permits both sides to strike at hidden, subtle, or subconscious biases
that may be just as threatening as overt prejudice to the concept of an... impar-
tial jury."''4
Peremptory challenges are often exercised upon "sudden impressions"
gathered from "bare looks and gestures" of prospective jurors.41 Sometimes
they are exercised to exclude jurors who are so indifferent that their resentment
about being detained quickly may turn into prejudice against one of the par-
ties.42 Occasionally, inferences of partiality arise from the "habits and associa-
tions" of prospective jurors, which, if not sufficient to justify a challenge for
cause, form the basis of a peremptory challenge.4 3 Finally, peremptory chal-
lenges are sometimes "exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation
or affiliations" of prospective jurors.44
Good civil trial lawyers view race and other group affiliations as important
factors in determining inherent biases of prospective jurors and in selecting im-
partial juries. "Given the need for reasonable limitations on the time devoted to
voir dire, the use of such 'proxies' ... may be extremely useful in eliminating
from the jury persons who might be biased in one way or another."' 45 "Common
human experience, common sense, psychosociological studies, and public opin-
ion polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people statistically have
predispositions that would make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds
of cases."' 46 One leading treatise on jury selection notes that race is an "ex-
tremely important" indication of how prospective jurors will decide cases, and
App. 148, 154, 256 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1979); 3) is employed by a party to the case, Blevins v. Erwin
Cotton Mills Co., 150 N.C. 493, 497, 64 S.E. 428, 429 (1909); 4) is an agent or employee of a party's
insurer, Fulcher v. Pine Lumber Co., 191 N.C. 408, 410, 132 S.E. 9, 11 (1926); 5) is a stockholder in
a party-corporation, Murchison Nat'l Bank v. Dunn Oil Mills Co., 150 N.C. 683, 686, 64 S.E. 883,
884-85 (1909); or 6) has a suit pending during the same term, State v. Ashburn, 187 N.C. 717, 719,
122 S.E. 833, 833 (1924). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1988) (listing nine permissible grounds
for a challenge for cause in a criminal trial). The trial court has discretion in allowing or denying
challenges for cause. State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 28, 357 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1987).
39. Note, supra note 29, at 1360.
40. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 28, at 354. Parties are afforded peremptory challenges at
least in part because prospective jurors seldom admit their biases. Denials of bias are not reliable for
several reasons:
[F]irst, jurors are embarrassed to admit their prejudices when questioned before a large
group; second, it is common for certain veniremen to decide that they want to be on the
jury and then to evade questions-often unconsciously-in order to avoid being struck;
third, jurors are often unaware of the existence or extent of their biases.
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted).
41. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); see State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 526, 231
S.E.2d 663, 676 (1977).
42. See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376.
43. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
44. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 79 (1986).
45. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138-39 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, " 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 553 (1975).
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thus, how peremptory challenges should be exercised.47 Another treatise notes
that "[g]enerally speaking, Jews, Blacks, Irish, Italians, Hispanics, Puerto Ri-
cans, and other groups that have experienced oppression are sympathetic and
have proplaintiff tendencies. Germans, Norwegians, Swedes, English, [and]
Orientals are thought by some to be better defense jurors."'4 8
For more than twenty years, the 1965 United States Supreme Court case
Swain v. Alabama4 9 was the seminal authority on the constitutional parameters
of peremptory challenges in criminal cases. The Swain court held that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion50 is not violated in any individual case by a prosecutor's purposeful exclu-
sion of black jurors through peremptory challenges.5 1 According to the Court,
only when peremptory challenges are used systematically, case after case, to ex-
clude blacks from jury service is the equal protection guarantee infringed.5 2 In
1986, the Supreme Court overruled Swain's case-after-case requirement. In Bat-
son v. Kentucky,53 the Court held that a criminal defendant can make out a
prima facie case of racial discrimination violating the equal protection clause
simply by showing that at the defendant's trial the prosecutor challenged pro-
spective jurors on the basis of race.5 4
The Batson court articulated a test for trial judges to follow in ascertaining
whether there has been impermissible discrimination in a criminal case. Ini-
tially, the defendant must show that she is a member of a "cognizable racial
group" and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove members
of that group.5 5 The defendant also must show that the "relevant circum-
47. R. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 64-65 (1979). Judge Wenke notes that
"[b]lacks tend to be proplaintiff... and sympathetic to the 'underdog,' the young, the blue collar
worker, and the unemployed. They tend to be prejudiced against executives." Id. at 76.
48. W. WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECTION § 1.04[8] (1988).
49. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
51. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221. The Court held:
In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a plural-
istic society in connection with the institution ofjury trial, we cannot hold that the Consti-
tution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges
in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecution is
using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecution therefore subjected to exami-
nation by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or
that they were removed because they were Negroes. Any other result, we think, would
establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it.
Id. at 222.
52. Id. at 223-24.
53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54. Id. at 96. The Court held:
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from the
venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors.., so it
forbids the State to strike black veniremen simply because the defendant is black. The core
guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on
account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the
basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race.
Id. at 97-98.
55. Id. at 96.
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stances" raise an inference of discrimination. 56 The trial judge then, in her dis-
cretion, must determine whether the defendant has established a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination.57 If the trial judge finds that a prima facie case of
discrimination exists, the prosecution must proffer nondiscriminatory explana-
tions for the exercise of the challenges, "related to the particular case to be
tried."' 58 Such explanations "need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause." 59 The prosecution, in offering such explanations, may not
assume that a black juror will be partial to a black defendant merely because of
their common race.60 Finally, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and "de-
termine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination."'6'
Batson has served as controlling precedent in several criminal cases recently
decided by the North Carolina appellate courts. In none of these opinions, how-
ever, has the court found a constitutional violation in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 62 The first such case was State v. Clay.63 Defendant's jury was em-
paneled on July 24, 1985. On July 26, 1985, the state rested. Three days later,
"the defendant filed a motion to dismiss all charges against her on the ground
that the State violated defendant's constitutional rights by systematically exclud-
ing five members of the jury of the black race, the same race as the defendant."'64
Because this was not a "timely objection" as required by Batson, the trial court
ruled that the objection had been waived. 65 The court of appeals agreed and
affirmed.6 6
In State v. Abbott 67 five black prospective jurors were called to the jury box.
The state peremptorily challenged three of them and defendant challenged one
for cause, with the resulting jury consisting of eleven whites and one black. 68
Defendant alleged racial discrimination violating Batson. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that
the defendant has not made a prima facie case of racially motivated
peremptory challenges. Five blacks were tendered as prospective ju-
rors to the State. It exercised peremptory challenges to three of them.
The State was willing to accept 40% of the blacks tendered.... There
was not a showing from the State's action in this case that it was deter-
mined not to let a black sit as a juror on account of the race of the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 96-97.
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. at 97.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 98.
62. But see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text for discussion of a North Carolina case
that found a procedural violation of Batson.
63. 85 N.C. App. 477, 355 S.E.2d 510, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 634, 360 S.E.2d 96 (1987).
64. Id. at 479, 355 S.E.2d at 512.
65. Id. (inferring from the factual context ofBatson a duty to make a timely objection to the
allegedly discriminatory peremptories).
66. Id. at 484, 355 S.E.2d at 514. Thus, the court of appeals never addressed the merits of
defendant's Batson claim.
67. 320 N.C. 475, 358 S.E.2d 365 (1987).
68. See id. at 480, 358 S.E.2d at 369.
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defendant. 69
In State v. Jackson70 the state exercised five peremptory challenges, four
against blacks and one against a white, so that the empaneled jury consisted of
eleven whites and one black.71 Finding that defendant had "'made a prima
facie showing of the inference of purposeful discrimination,' "72 the prosecutor
was called upon to offer nondiscriminatory explanations for her challenges. In
response, the prosecutor first noted that one of the state's principal witnesses
was a black detective; therefore, race was not a consideration in selecting the
jury.73 She then stated that one black was challenged because she was unem-
ployed and had been a student counselor at Shaw University. 74 These factors,
the prosecutor said, indicated a liberal bias.75 A second black was challenged
because he was a law student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
where he had been taught by professors of "somewhat liberal views."' 76 A third
black was challenged because of hesitant answers to voir dire questions and per-
ceived indifference or hostility toward serving on the jury.77 The final black was
challenged because she had a son the approximate age of defendant and, because
defendant's mother was expected to testify, would likely lean toward defend-
ant.7 8 After analyzing these explanations, the trial judge denied defendant's mo-
tion for a mistrial. 79 The supreme court, after reviewing the procedural
requirements of Batson,80 the prosecutor's nondiscriminatory explanations,
81
and use of the Batson model in other jurisdictions, 82 held that "taking into ac-
count all circumstances of the case,"'83 although "[w]e might not have reached
69. Id. at 481-82, 358 S.E.2d at 369-70. Similarly, in State v. Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 459, 368
S.E.2d 627, 628 (1988), the supreme court held that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie
case under Batson because only two of six peremptory challenges were exercised against blacks.
70. 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988).
71. Id. at 252-53, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
72. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839 (quoting trial court).
73. Id. At this point the prosecutor also stated:
"Prior to trial my co-counsel and I felt that it was of the utmost importance that we select
a jury that was stable, government oriented, employed, and had sufficient ties to the com-
munity... [to] pay more attention to the needs of law enforcement than the fine points of
individual rights."
Id. (quoting prosecutor's statement to the trial court). The supreme court approved of the prosecu-
tor's use of such a jury profile, holding that these factors "are legitimate criteria in picking a jury."
Id. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 841.
74. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 254, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
80. Id. at 254-55, 368 S.E.2d at 839-40; see supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
81. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 256-57, 368 S.E.2d at 840.
82. Id. at 255-56, 368 S.E.2d at 840-41. The court looked to explanations that have been ac-
cepted as nondiscriminatory in other jurisdictions, such as potential black jurors' youth, unemploy-
ment, avoiding of eye contact, United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1987),
"educational backgrounds, their employment history, the employment of their spouses and children,
and criminal record," People v. Cartagena, 128 A.D.2d 797, 797, 513 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498, appeal
denied, 70 N.Y.2d 798, 516 N.E.2d 1229, 522 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1987), and religious preference, Cham-
bers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
83. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840. These circumstances included:
1268 [Vol. 67
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the same result as the superior court[,] ... giving, as we must, deference to its
findings, we hold it was not error to deny the defendant's motion for mistrial."'8 4
State v. Green 8 5 is to date the only North Carolina appellate opinion to
remand a lower court's disposition on the basis of Batson. The remand, how-
ever, was on procedural, not substantive, grounds. In Green, defendant pleaded
guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of robbery. He was
tried by a jury as to punishment and was sentenced to death. Defendant ap-
pealed to the supreme court, alleging racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.8 6 The supreme court remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing 6n the issue of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.8 7 The
trial court, on remand, ruled that defendant could neither cross-examine the
prosecutor nor introduce evidence at the hearing.8 8 After listening to the prose-
cutor's explanations, the trial judge concluded that racial discrimination had not
occurred.89 The supreme court remanded yet again, holding that it was error to
deny defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence at the hearing: "If the
defendant can put on evidence which tends to rebut the State's contentions he
should be allowed to do so. If the case for discrimination is stronger than can be
shown by the pattern of strikes in the present case, the defendant should have
the benefit of this showing." 90
The use of peremptories to exclude members of distinct groups from jury
service in a criminal case also has been attacked on sixth amendment grounds.9 1
(I) one of the principal witnesses for the State was a black police officer, (2) the first per-
emptory challenge was to a white juror, (3) the State left a black person on the jury when it
still had three peremptory challenges, and (4) there were no comments by either prosecutor
which would indicate a discriminatory intent by the State.
Id.
84. Id. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 841. The court of appeals considered a similar case in State v.
Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 374 S.E.2d 604 (1988). There the state exercised a total of six peremp-
tory challenges-all against blacks. Upon defendants' objections, the state, without any request to
do so from the trial court, proffered nondiscriminatory explanations for the first three challenges.
The trial court required explanations for the next three challenges. The prosecutor explained that
five of the six challenged jurors had connections to a defendant, a member of a defendant's family, or
to a state's witness. The sixth juror was challenged because he recently had been fined for a traffic
violation for which he insisted he was innocent. Id. at 252-53, 374 S.E.2d at 606-08. The trial court
overruled defendants' objections, "finding that the peremptory challenges were not made with a
purpose to discriminate." Id. at 252, 374 S.E.2d at 607-08. Noting both the nondiscriminatory
explanations and lack of a record indicating the prosecutor made any comments implying a purpose
to discriminate, the court of appeals held: "After paying special deference to the findings of the trial
court as mandated by Jackson, we hold the court did not err in finding the State's explanations
sufficient to rebut any prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination that may have been made by
defendants." Id. at 252, 374 S.E.2d at 608.
85. 324 N.C. 238, 376 S.E.2d 727 (1989) [hereinafter Green I1].
86. Id. at 239, 376 S.E.2d at 728. The opinion does not indicate how many blacks were chal-
lenged by the prosecution.
87. Id. at 240, 376 S.E.2d at 728; see State v. Green, 320 N.C. 173, 358 S.E.2d 60 (1988) (Green
I). The sentencing trial took place before Batson was decided. Green 11, 324 N.C. at 240, 376 S.E.2d
at 727.
88. Green I1 at 240, 376 S.C.2d at 728.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The United States Supreme Court has had two opportunities to rule on whether the exercise of
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the 1984 case of McCray v. Abrams92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ruled on a case in which the prosecutor used eight of her
eleven peremptories to challenge seven prospective black jurors and one prospec-
tive Hispanic juror, resulting in an all-white jury. The trial judge denied defend-
ant's request to have the prosecutor explain her motivations for these challenges
and denied defendant's motion for mistrial. 93 The Second Circuit, precluded by
Swain from finding an equal protection violation,94 instead focused on the
Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Taylor v. Louisiana.9 5 There the Court held
that the sixth amendment requires that trial juries be selected from a venire
representing a fair cross section of the community.96 From Taylor, the Second
Circuit extrapolated that "the state is not permitted to restrict unreasonably the
possibility that the petit jury will comprise a fair cross section of the commu-
nity."' 97 Thus, the court reasoned, the state's use of peremptory challenges pur-
posefully to remove all nonwhites from the jury violates the fair cross section
requirement of the sixth amendment.98 The court therefore reversed and re-
manded for a new trial.99 The Second Circuit is one of only two federal circuits
to extend Taylor's fair cross section requirement to the use of peremptory chal-
lenges. 10° Seven state appellate courts also have held that a prosecutor violates
peremptory challenges can violate the sixth amendment. The first was Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), in which the Court, though presented with a sixth amendment challenge, see id. at 112-18
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), decided the case on fourteenth amendment grounds. See supra notes 53-
61 and accompanying text. In a footnote, the Batson court expressed "no view on the merits of any
of petitioner's sixth amendment arguments." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. More recently, in Teague
v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the Court sidestepped the peremptory challenge question alto-
gether-though this was the question on which certiorari was granted, id. at 1065-and decided the
case instead on retroactivity grounds. Id. at 1065, 1069.
92. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, No. 84-2026, slip op. (2d Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court remanded for the
Second Circuit to reconsider its holding in light of Batson. Abrams v. McCray, 478 U.S. 1001, 1001
(1986). Although the Second Circuit did not have the chance to reevaluate its opinion in light of
Batson because of the parties' settlement, the following year it reaffirmed that McCray was good law
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's remand. See Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 224-27 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1311 (1989).
93. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1115.
94. Id. at 1123-24. McCray was decided before Batson; thus Swain was still the controlling
authority on the equal protection parameters of peremptory challenges. For a discussion of Swain,
see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
95. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
96. Id. at 530.
97. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1129.
98. Id. at 1131.
99. Id. at 1135.
100. The Sixth Circuit followed McCray in Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated
and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001, opinion reinstated, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987). In Booker the prosecutor used 22 of 26 peremptory challenges to
exclude potential black jurors, in several instances without addressing a single question to the ex-
cused juror. Defendant was tried and convicted before an all-white jury. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that "under the Sixth Amendment, neither prosecutor nor defense counsel may systematically exer-
cise peremptory challenges to excuse members of a cognizable group from service on a criminal petit
jury." Id. at 772. Contra United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed,
109 S. Ct. 1564 (1989); Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d
832 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d
541 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1074, remanded to district court, 813 F.2d 658
(5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Thompson, 730 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1024
(1984); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
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their state constitutions' fair cross section requirement by using peremptory
challenges purposefully to exclude members of distinct groups from serving on
the criminal trial jury.10 1
In State v. Belton 10 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court was invited to
adopt the Second Circuit's fair cross section analysis either through the sixth
amendment to the federal constitution or article I, section twenty-four of the
state constitution. 10 3 Two black men were charged with kidnapping and raping
two white women. The state used eight of its fourteen peremptory challenges,
including challenges to alternates, to excuse potential black jurors. The petit
jury that convicted defendants consisted of eight whites and four blacks. 1°4
During the selection process, the state passed on seven black prospective jurors
while peremptorily challenging six whites. 10 5 Defendants requested the supreme
court to adopt the McCray analysis "to preclude the state from challenging pe-
remptorily prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race or group affilia-
tion. .... "106 Noting that the facts did not create an inference that the
peremptory challenges had been exercised solely on the basis of race,10 7 the
court refused to consider whether a McCray analysis is warranted under either
the United States or North Carolina Constitutions.108 In a bitter dissent, Justice
Meyer scolded his colleagues for refusing to decide the substantive question
whether the federal or state constitution permits a McCray analysis.10 9
101. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Fields v.
People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass.
461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489
A.2d 1175 (1985), aff'd, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612
P.2d 716 (1980). These cases all were decided during the period in which Swain precluded an equal
protection challenge to allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in an individual case.
These state courts, searching for a method to prohibit such a practice, looked to the impartial jury
provisions of their state constitutions to imply the fair cross section requirement that Taylor held
was embodied in the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. Two state appellate courts re-
cently have joined McCray and Booker in holding that group-based peremptories are prohibited by
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Superior Ct. In & For Maricopa
County, 157 Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988); People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d
986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
102. 318 N.C. 141, 347 S.E.2d 755 (1986).
103. Id. at 158, 347 S.E.2d at 765. Article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict
of ajury in open court." Defendant, in his brief, suggested that the word "jury" in this section means
a "fair jury," thus giving rise to the fair cross section requirement. See Brief for Appellant at 4,
Belton (No. 693A84).
104. Belton, 318 N.C. at 153, 347 S.E.2d at 762-63. One alternate was white and one was black.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 158, 347 S.E.2d at 765.
107. Id. at 159, 347 S.E.2d at 766. Citing the state's passing on seven blacks though challenging
six whites, the court concluded that "[tihe challenges complained of affirmatively demonstrate that
concerns other than race must have motivated the prosecutor." Id.
108. Id. at 158, 347 S.E.2d at 765.
109. Id. at 169-72, 347 S.E.2d at 770-72 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer, concluding that
such an analysis is flawed under either constitution, insisted that "[t]he possibility that a prosecutor
will systematically eliminate a defendant's 'fair chance' at a representative cross-section by systemat-
ically removing blacks or other racial minorities-McCray's ultimate concern-has been eliminated
by the holding in Batson v. Kentucky." Id. at 171-72, 347 S.E.2d at 772 (Meyer, J., dissenting). After
Belton, the supreme court declined another opportunity to employ a McCray analysis in State v.
Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 655, 365 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1988), citing lack of an adequate record. Defend-
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No federal appellate court has extended the fair cross section rationale of
McCray to prohibit the use of race-based peremptory challenges in civil cases.
Very recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for both the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits has extended Batson's equal protection rationale to civil
cases. 110 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. lII an injured 34-year-old
black worker brought a personal injury action against defendant construction
company in federal district court.1 12 Defendant challenged peremptorily two
black and one white prospective jurors. 113 Plaintiff objected and asked the dis-
trict court to require defendant to proffer nondiscriminatory explanations for the
challenges to the prospective black jurors. The trial judge denied the request,
declaring that Batson does not apply to civil trials.1 4 The jury of eleven whites
and one black found plaintiff eighty percent at fault for his injuries, and reduced
his verdict accordingly." 15
The Fifth Circuit, in analyzing plaintiff's appeal grounded upon Batson,
first considered whether there is sufficient "state action" in the selection of a civil
jury to implicate the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment.11 6 The
Edmonson court relied in part on a recent Supreme Court case that held, "the
state acts when 'private parties make use of state procedures with the overt,
significant assistance of state officials.' "117 The court concluded that because
"it is the judge, acting in a judicial capacity, who excuses the prospective juror"
ant actually had "filed a motion to require the court reporter to note the race of every potential juror
examined to perfect the record and determine if there was a substantial likelihood that any jurors
were challenged on the basis of race." Id. at 653, 365 S.E.2d at 556. The trial court denied the
motion. Id. The supreme court held:
If a defendant in cases such as this believes a prospective juror to be of a particular
race, he can bring this fact to the trial court's attention and ensure that it is made a part of
the record. Further, if there is any question as to the prospective juror's race, this issue
should be resolved by the trial court based upon questioning of the juror or other proper
evidence, as opposed to leaving the issue to the court reporter who may not make counsel
aware of the doubt. In the present case the defendant did not avail himself of this opportu-
nity, despite the trial court's suggestion at the pre-trial hearing that he might wish to do so
during jury selection.... Thus, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor
exercised peremptory challenges solely to remove members of any particular race from the
jury.
Id. at 656, 365 S.E.2d at 557-58.
110. Both of these cases were decided after Jackson 111. Before these two cases were decided,
one federal district court had extended Batson to civil cases. In Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F.
Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), three civil rights actions were brought against a city and its police
officers. The trial judge held that the assistant city attorney's conduct in using peremptories to strike
each of the eight prospective black jurors called to the jury box in the three trials was "constitution-
ally impermissible" because seven of the eight admittedly were excluded solely on account of their
race. Id. at 894.
111. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted, 860 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 1309-10. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
113. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310. Each party to a federal civil trial is entitled to three peremp-
tory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982).
114. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310.
115. Id.
116. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee expressly applies only to the states.
In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment's due
process clause implies an equal protection guarantee in federal actions.
117. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1311 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 457
U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
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peremptorily challenged,1 18 the exercise of such challenges constitutes "state ac-
tion."1 19 The court then reasoned that "[riacial prejudice has no more place in
the federal courtroom on the days the court is conducting a civil trial than it
does on the days when the same judge, seated on the same bench, in the same
courtroom, is conducting a criminal trial." 120 The court concluded:
If we were to limit Batson to criminal cases, we would betray Batson's
fundamental principle: the state's use, toleration, and approval of per-
emptory challenges based on race violates the equal protection clause.
We, therefore, hold that the principle announced by the Supreme
Court in Batson applies to civil cases as well. 121
Two weeks after Edmonson was decided, the Eleventh Circuit reached the
same conclusion in Fludd v. Dykes.122 Plaintiff, a black man, was shot by a white
police officer while the latter was attempting to take a suspected narcotics traf-
ficker into custody. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the officer and his
white supervisor. 12 3 Defendants peremptorily challenged two black prospective
jurors, resulting in an all-white jury that returned a verdict for defendants.1 24
Just as in Edmonson, the trial court refused plaintiff's request to require defense
counsel to proffer nondiscriminatory explanations for the challenges, ruling that
Batson is inapplicable to civil cases.' 25 The court of appeals reasoned that the
trial judge's overruling of one party's objection to the other party's use of per-
emptory challenges in a civil trial constitutes "state action" sufficient to impli-
cate equal protection principles.1 26 The court then concluded:
[T]he policies underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Batson are
equally applicable in the civil context .... [W]e see no reason why a
civil litigant would be unduly prejudiced by explaining the purpose of a
strike where the circumstantial evidence indicates that he made it for a
discriminatory purpose .... We therefore hold that Batson applies in
civil cases. 127
Prior to Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, two state appellate
courts had held that race- or group-based peremptory challenges, even in civil
cases, violate their state constitutions. In Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co.,128 a case
decided before Batson, a California Court of Appeal held that group-based per-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1313. The court reasoned: "By carrying out his duties in a way that permits peremp-
tory challenges based on race, the rust of the judge's approval of discrimination rubs off onto society,
corroding the national character by giving private prejudice the imprimatur of state approval." Id.
120. Id. at 1313-14 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 1314. Judge Gee's dissent admittedly quarreled less with the majority's rationale in
extending Batson to civil cases than with the principle embodied in Batson itself: "What remains
after today's holding is not the peremptory challenge which our procedure has known for decades-
or not one which can be freely exercised against all jurors in all cases, at any rate." Id. at 1317 (Gee,
J., dissenting).
122. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 824. The suit was grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
124. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 823.
125. Id. at 824.
126. Id. at 828.
127. Id. at 828-29.
128. 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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emptories in civil cases violate its state constitution. Plaintiff, a black man, had
brought a negligence action. During voir dire, defense counsel, without con-
ducting any questioning, exercised three of six peremptory challenges to exclude
all three prospective black jurors who were called to the box and were not ex-
cused for cause. Plaintiff unsuccessfully objected to defendant's use of per-
emptories and plaintiff's claim was tried by an all-white jury. The jury returned
a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed. 129
The Holley court reasoned that group-based peremptories raise "substan-
tially similar constitutional concerns" in civil cases as they do in criminal
cases. 130
[A] failure to permit similar judicial supervision in a civil setting
would not only frustrate ... [the] fundamental purpose [of achieving
impartiality through group interaction], but would conceivably sanc-
tion the indiscriminate use of peremptory challenges based upon group
bias alone thus seriously eroding the constitutional guarantee extended
equally to civil litigants. 13 1
The Holley court then reiterated the procedural inquiry the California Supreme
Court had formulated to test the use of group-based peremptories for constitu-
tional violations in criminal cases.132 The inquiry begins with a timely objection
to the opposing attorney's use of apparently race-based peremptory chal-
lenges. 133 Next, the objecting attorney must establish that the excluded
venirepersons are members of a cognizable group. t 34 She then must demon-
strate a strong likelihood that such prospective jurors were challenged on the
basis of group affiliation, rather than their individual bias in the particular
case. 135 These factors will establish a prima facie showing of the impermissible
exercise of peremptory challenges.' 36 At this point, the burden shifts to the
allegedly offending attorney to offer non-group-based reasons for the chal-
lenges. 137 If the trial judge believes the attorney's explanations, the prima facie
case is rebutted, and jury selection resumes.' 38 If, however, the trial judge finds
that the attorney's explanations are pretexts and that the challenges actually
were exercised on the basis of group affiliation, the entire venire must be
quashed, and jury selection must begin anew. 139 The court of appeal found suffi-
129. Id. at 590-93, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 75-78.
130. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
131. Id. The Holley court's decision was grounded on a state constitutional provision that pro-
vides in pertinent part: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all.... ." CAL.
CONST., art. I, § 16. The California Supreme Court previously had interpreted this section to re-
quire criminal petit juries to be as near a representative cross section of the community as random
draw permits. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
132. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
133. Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 591, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
137. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
138. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
139. Id. This inquiry is very similar to the one announced three years later by the United States
Supreme Court in Batson. See supra notes 55-61.
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cient evidence in the record to make out a prima facie case of impermissible use
of peremptories. 4° Because the trial judge did not require defendant's counsel
to proffer neutral explanations for the challenges, the court reversed the jury's
verdict and remanded for a new trial. 41
In City of Miami v. Cornett 142 a Florida District Court of Appeal held that
the impartial jury rationale underlying the prohibition of race-based peremptory
challenges in criminal cases "applies with equal force to a civil jury trial."' 143
Plaintiff, a black man, sued the City of Miami and two of its police officers for
injuries, including paralysis, suffered from a gunshot to the back during appre-
hension. Four blacks were summoned to the venire. Defense counsel, over
plaintiff's objections, used each of his four allotted peremptories to exclude each
of the black venirepersons as they were called to the box. The all-white jury
found for defendant. On plaintiff's motion, the trial judge ordered a new trial,
agreeing with plaintiff's contention that defendant's use of peremptories improp-
erly denied plaintiff an impartial jury.144
The district court of appeal affirmed, ieiterating the procedural test the
Florida Supreme Court had fashioned to scrutinize race-based peremptory chal-
lenges in criminal cases, 145 which is almost identical to the California court's
Holley test. 146 Because the trial judge in Cornett did not require defense counsel
to explain the allegedly race-based peremptories, a new trial was required. 147
Despite this large body of relevant law, the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point 14 8 addressed the issues raised by
the case in a two-page opinion. In its brevity, the opinion failed to address the
intent of the drafters of article I, section twenty-six of the state constitution,
which might have led the court to a different conclusion. Such an analysis par-
ticularly was warranted because this was the first time the supreme court
grounded an opinion squarely on this provision. 149 The court also failed to es-
tablish a procedure through which civil parties can challenge the use of per-
140. Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
141. Id. at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
142. 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 469 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1985).
143. Id. at 400. The court's decision was grounded on article I, section 22 of the Florida Consti-
tution, which provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate."
The Florida Supreme Court, employing a McCray analysis, set forth supra at notes 92-99 and ac-
companying text, previously had interpreted this section to forbid the exclusion of blacks from crimi-
nal juries through peremptory challenges. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
144. Cornett, 463 So. 2d at 400-01.
145. See Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486-87 (Fla. 1984).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 132-39. The one major distinction between the Holley
test and the Cornett test is that the latter specifically is limited to cognizable racial groups. Cornett,
463 So. 2d at 401.
147. Cornett, 463 So. 2d at 402.
148. 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988).
149. In State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 303, 357 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1987), however, the court held
that racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman denies the equal protection guar-
anteed by sections 19 and 26 of article I. The court held:
Article I, section 26 does more than protect individuals from unequal treatment. The
people of North Carolina have declared in this provision that they will not tolerate the
corruption of their juries by racism, sexism and similar forms of irrational prejudice. They
have recognized that the judicial system of a democratic society must operate evenhand-
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emptories allegedly motivated by race. Most importantly, the court failed to
recognize that a prospective juror's race may, in some instances, affect her view
of the case.
Although the court concluded that article I, section twenty-six "would be
eviscerated if the use of peremptory challenges did not come within its am-
bit,"' 150 the history behind its adoption strongly suggests that peremptory chal-
lenges never were intended to come within its ambit. The current language of
article I, section twenty-six first appeared in the 1971 constitution. 1 51 The previ-
ous constitution, however, contained a similar provision that was enacted in
1945: "No person shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex." 152
This provision was adopted three months after the state supreme court held in
State v. Emery 153 that women were not eligible to serve on juries. The Emery
court concluded that "until the common-law disqualification of sex is removed
from our law, women are not required to assume the obligation of jury service.
They were ineligible for such service at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of 1868, and the same law which then obtained still subsists."' 154 The 1945
constitutional amendment obviously was drafted to overrule Emery.155 Because
Emery stood for the blanket proposition that women were disqualified or ineligi-
ble to perform jury services, the opposite conclusion must be reached about the
1945 provision-it merely provided that women are qualified or eligible to serve
on juries. Neither Emery nor the 1945 amendment had anything to do with the
use of peremptory challenges; they were concerned with the selection of the jury
venire from the community at large. 15 6 Because the language of article I, section
twenty-six tracked its 1945 counterpart, adding "race, color, religion, or na-
edly if it is to command the respect and support of those subject to its jurisdiction. It must
also be perceived to operate evenhandedly.
Id. at 302, 357 S.E.2d at 625 (footnote omitted).
150. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
151. North Carolina citizens have adopted three constitutions since statehood-the constitutions
of 1776, 1868, and 1971. T. EURE, CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA: ITS HISTORY AND CON-
TENT iii (1985).
152. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 19 (1945). The 1971 provision (article I, section 26) pro-
vides: "No person shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or
national origin." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26.
153. 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944). The majority, over two bitter dissents, held that article
I, section 19 of the constitution of 1868, which provided that "[n]o person shall be convicted of any
crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court," N.C. CONST.
1868, art. I, § 19 (1868) (emphasis added), should be read literally to exclude women from eligibility
to serve on criminal juries. The court therefore held that defendant's jury, comprised often men and
two women, was constitutionally infirm in that it contained women. Emery, 224 N.C. at 589, 31
S.E.2d at 864.
154. Emery, 224 N.C. at 584, 31 S.E.2d at 861 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
155. Not only did the general assembly enact the amendment three months after the decision
was handed down, it amended all seven sections of the constitution in which men explicitly were
given privileges not afforded to women by substituting the word "person" in each instance. Act of
March 15, 1945, ch. 634, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 875.
156. See Emery, 224 N.C. at 587, 31 S.E.2d at 862-63 (majority argues that the process of draw-
ing up jury lists would have to change significantly if women were declared eligible for jury service);
Act of March 15, 1945, ch. 634, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 875 (indicating, parenthetically, that the effect
of the amendment to article I, section 19 was "[qualifying women to serve on juries." (emphasis
added)).
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tional origin"' 157 to the sentence, it is probable that its drafters did not intend its
protection to extend further than it had before-to the qualification or eligibility
of prospective jurors to be included on jury venires. Therefore, the most plausi-
ble reading of article I, section twenty-six is one that prohibits the exclusion of
gender, racial, color, religious, and nationality groups from jury venires, not
from petit juries.
North Carolina's official constitutional history1 5 8 supports this view of arti-
cle I, section twenty-six. The history notes that "all the rights newly expressed
in [article I of] the Constitution of 1971 were already guaranteed by the United
States Constitution[.] [T]heir inclusion simply constituted an explicit recogni-
tion by the state of their importance." 159 If this historical note is accurate, there
is no doubt that the Jackson opinion goes much further than the drafters of
article I, section twenty-six intended, because it was not until 1986 that the
United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges in
a given case is constrained by the Constitution. 160
Before Jackson, the North Carolina Supreme Court tacitly had interpreted
article I, section twenty-six to apply only to jury venires, not petit juries and the
use of peremptory challenges. During the fifteen-year period between the adop-
tion of the 1971 constitution and Batson, the North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled on five cases in which criminal defendants presented solid evidence of ra-
cially motivated peremptory challenges in their jury selections.1 61 One of these
cases specifically called the court's attention to article I, section twenty-six as
requiring relief.162 If the court believed that article I, section twenty-six applied
to petit juries and the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, it would have
interceded on behalf of the defendants, who each were convicted by all-white or
157. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26. The inclusion of these new groups in the 1971 constitution proba-
bly was motivated by passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on ac-
count of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
158. T. EURE, supra note 151.
159. T. EURE, supra note 151, at 9. The accuracy of this notation, however, is questionable.
Although it is true that by 1971 the Supreme Court had held that the exclusion of blacks from jury
venires violates the fourteenth amendment, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), the
Court never has held that the exclusion of religious or national groups from jury venires violates the
Constitution.
160. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), discussed supra at notes 53-61 and accom-
panying text; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1945), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986), discussed supra at notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Strauder stood only for
the proposition that blacks are qualified to serve on juries and therefore must be included on jury
lists. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-10.
161. See State v. Gilliam, 317 N.C. 293, 297, 344 S.E.2d 783, 786 (1986) (objection grounded on
N.C. CoNST. art I, §§ 19 & 24); State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 546-47, 268 S.E.2d 161, 168 (1980)
(objection grounded on state constitution, generally); State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 376, 222 S.E.2d
222, 225 (1976) (objection grounded on U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670,
681, 202 S.E.2d 750, 758 (1974) (objection grounded on U.S. CONST. amends. VI & XIV and N.C.
CONsT. art I, § 26), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); State v. Shaw, 284 N.C. 366, 370, 200
S.E.2d 585, 588 (1973) (objection grounded on N.C. CONST. art I, § 19).
162. Noell, 284 N.C. at 681, 202 S.E.2d at 758. The court held that Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), discussed supra at notes 49-52
and accompanying text, was the controlling authority, notwithstanding article I, section 26. Noell,
284 N.C. at 682-83, 202 S.E.2d at 758-59.
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nearly all-white juries. 163 Instead, in each of these cases, the court held that
Swain v. Alabama 164 insulated the prosecutor's peremptory challenges from at-
tack.165 Not until 1988 in Jackson did the court hold that the antidiscrimina-
tion provision of article I, section twenty-six, which has existed in some form
since 1945,166 applies to petit juries and the use of peremptory challenges.
Another serious shortcoming of Jackson is its failure to establish a proce-
dure by which the trial court may address claims of improper use of peremptory
challenges in civil cases. The court's only guide to litigants concerned the quan-
tum of evidence necessary to prevail on such a claim at the appellate level:
The statement by plaintiff's counsel is not sufficient, standing alone, to
support a finding of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. We
hold that as a rule of practice, counsel who seek to rely upon an alleged
impropriety in the jury selection process must provide the reviewing
court with the relevant portions of the transcript of the jury voir
dire. 167
Because the court noted that its holding was supported by the California deci-
sion in Holley and the Florida decision in Cornett,168 it is possible that it in-
tended to endorse the procedural tests set forth in those cases. 169 It also is
possible the court intended for trial courts to use the Batson procedure to ana-
lyze possible violations. 170 Unfortunately, litigants and trial judges cannot be
absolutely sure what procedure the court had in mind.
The most serious shortcoming of Jackson, however, is its failure to recog-
nize that a juror's sex, race, color, religion, or national origin may affect substan-
tially the juror's view of a particular case. 171 Jackson appears to hold that it is
constitutionally impermissible for defense counsel to challenge peremptorily
blacks called to the jury box in a suit by a black against a white-run police
department alleging false arrest; for defense counsel to challenge peremptorily
women called to the jury box in a suit brought by a woman alleging sexual
harassment by a male employer; and for defense counsel to challenge perempto-
rily Jews called to the jury box in a suit brought by a Jew against a Nazi sympa-
163. Gilliam, 317 N.C. at 297, 344 S.E.2d at 785 (jury consisted of 11 whites and one black);
Brief for Appellant at 14, Lynch (Nos. 79 CRS 7592, 79 CRS 7593, 79 CRS 7594) (all-white jury);
Alford, 289 N.C. at 376, 222 S.E.2d at 225 (all-white jury); Noell, 284 N.C. at 681, 202 S.E.2d at 758
(all-white jury); Shaw, 284 N.C. at 369, 200 S.E.2d at 587 (all-white jury).
164. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), discussed
supra at notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
165. Gilliam, 317 N.C. at 297, 344 S.E.2d at 786; Lynch, 300 N.C. at 546, 268 S.E.2d at 168;
Alford, 289 N.C. at 377, 222 S.E.2d at 226; Noell, 284 N.C. at 682-83, 202 S.E.2d at 758-59; Shaw,
284 N.C. at 369-70, 200 S.E.2d at 587-88.
166. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
167. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 585-86, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
168. Id. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
169. See supra notes 133-139 & 146 and accompanying text. Holley is discussed supra at notes
128-41 and accompanying text; Cornett is discussed supra at notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of this procedure see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. Such a
test, however, does not seem consistent with article I, § 26 because Batson sought to proscribe dis-
crimination in jury selection whereas Jackson III sought to proscribe exclusion of particular groups
injury selection. For further discussion of this distinction see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text.
171. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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thizer alleging that the latter defaced the former's home with a swastika. Yet in
each case it is at least plausible that the individuals in the excluded group would
find it difficult to remain impartial. Prohibiting counsel from exercising peremp-
tory challenges to screen out such perceived bias is seriously at odds with the
overriding purpose of peremptory challenges--"to strike at hidden, subtle, or
subconscious biases that may be just as threatening as overt prejudice to the
concept of an .. .impartial jury." 172 Moreover, given the limited time and
scope of voir dire, and the resistance of most people to admitting their biases in
public, 173 disallowing trial lawyers' use of such group affiliations as proxies for
specific bias almost certainly will result in partial juries and unfair trials.
Rather than holding that article I, section twenty-six of the North Carolina
Constitution facially prohibits peremptory challenges on the basis of group affili-
ation, the North Carolina Supreme Court should have extended Batson to the
civil setting either through article I, section nineteen of the North Carolina Con-
stitution, 174 or through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits did subsequent to Jackson.17 5 Such a
holding would have achieved the desired result-preventing racial discrimina-
tion in civil jury selection-without eliminating the effective use of peremptory
challenges.
There are two central distinctions between Jackson's article I, section
twenty-six rationale and Batson's equal protection rationale. First, Jackson pro-
hibits not only race-based peremptory challenges, but challenges on the basis of
sex, religion, and national origin as well. 176 Batson is limited to race-based chal-
lenges.177 The imposition on the use of peremptory challenges is therefore more
pronounced under Jackson. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Jackson
recognizes "exclusion" as a constitutional violation 178 whereas Batson recog-
172. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 28, at 354.
173. See supra note 40.
174. Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimi-
nation by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin." N.C. CONST. art I, § 19.
Although plaintiff's brief in Jackson III did not call the court's attention specifically to the equal
protection clause embodied in either the state or federal constitution, it is replete with references to
Batson. Brief for Appellant at 4-9, 17, 18. The court easily could have construed the brief as an
argument for extension of Batson to the civil arena.
Although the equal protection clause extends only to state action, jury selection in civil trials
does implicate the equal protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions: state action
exists when "the state calls together the individuals that form the jury, instructs them as to their
task, and then relies upon their conclusions." Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1682-83 (1985); see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1311-
13 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted, 860 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1989), discussed supra at notes
111-21 and accompanying text; Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (11th Cir. 1989), discussed supra
at notes 122-27 and accompanying text; cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (all holding that when the state actively encourages or other-
wise participates in discriminatory conduct, state action exists and the equal protection clause is
implicated).
175. See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
176. See N.C. CONsT. art I, § 26.
177. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
178. Jackson III, 321 N.C. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 416.
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nizes "discrimination" as a constitutional violation. 179 The distinction is subtle,
yet crucial. Jackson proscribes peremptory challenges against distinct groups
even though there may be a reason relevant to the particular case to doubt the
ability of members of such groups to remain impartial. The opinion fails to
recognize that "group affiliation can be relevant to identifying situation-specific
bias." 180 Batson, on the other hand, does not prohibit peremptory challenges
against members of a particular group if their exclusion is "related to the partic-
ular case to be tried." 18 1 In short, Batson proscribes invidious discrimination-
striking jurors because of their race, without regard to the importance of racial
issues in the case to be tried-but allows peremptory challenges to be used effec-
tively to achieve impartial juries.1 82
If the North Carolina Supreme Court intended Jackson to be a message
that racial discrimination will not be tolerated in North Carolina's civil justice
system, the court should be applauded for its intent. By choosing article I, sec-
tion twenty-six of the state constitution as the medium to deliver that message,
however, the court not only contravened the intent of that provision's drafters,
and its own treatment of article I, section twenty-six between 1971 and 1986, but
seriously intruded upon the centuries-old statutory right of parties to a civil suit
to exercise peremptory challenges. The implications of Jackson on the imparti-
ality of civil juries are profound. If the supreme court wanted to eliminate racial
discrimination in civil trials, it could have done so by extending Batson to the
civil setting without seriously encroaching on the use of peremptory challenges.
STEVEN B. EPSTEIN
179. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-100.
180. Note, supra note 29, at 1371.
181. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
182. The McCray analysis, set forth supra at notes 92-99 and accompanying text, has the same
shortcomings as Jackson III in that it: 1) constitutionally prohibits peremptory challenges against a
wide array of demographic groups (even wider than the groups protected by Jackson III); and 2)
fails to recognize that there may be instances in which group affiliation is so central to a particular
case that peremptory challenges on the basis of such affiliations are absolutely necessary for the
acquisition of an impartial jury.
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